In this paper, we study path auction games in which multiple edges may be owned by the same agent. The edge costs and the set of edges owned by the same agent are privately known to the owner of the edges. In this setting, we show that, assuming that edges not on the winning path always get 0 payment, there is no individually rational, strategyproof mechanism in which only edge costs are reported. If the agents are asked to report costs as well as identity information, we show that there is no Pareto efficient mechanism that is false-name proof. We then study a first-price path auction in this model. We show that, in the special case of parallel-path graphs, there is always a Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium in bids. However, this result does not extend to general graphs: we construct a graph in which there is no Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium.
Introduction and Motivation
In the path auction game, there is a network G = (V, E), in which each edge e ∈ E is owned by an agent. The true cost of e is private information and known only to the owner. Given two vertices, source s and destination t, the auctioneer's task is to buy a path from s to t. The path auction game can be used to model problems in supply chain management, transportation management, QoS routing and other domains. Recently, path auctions have been extensively studied [3, 9, 5, 6, 8] ; most of the literature has focused on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) class of mechanisms [4, 2, 1] . In the most natural VCG mechanism, the auctioneer pays each agent on the winning path an amount equal to the highest bid with which the agent would still be on the winning path. This mechanism is attractive because it is efficient and strategyproof, i.e., the dominant strategy for each agent is to report his true cost.
Motivation for a new model
In the traditional path auction model, each agent only owns one edge in the graph, and there is no cooperation between agents. Here, we study a variant of the path auction game in which each agent may own multiple edges. In this extended model, if ownership information is publicly available (i.e. the auctioneer Fig. 1 . VCG mechanism is not strategyproof for this game knows which agent owns which edge), the VCG mechanism design approach still yields a strategyproof mechanism.
In practice, however, ownership information is often private -it could be costly for the auctioneer to find out the true ownership information, or an agent may have incentive to hide the true ownership information in order to get better payoff. For example, in Figure 1 , there are two agents: a and b. Agent a owns edges (s, i) and (i, t) with true cost 1 each; agent b owns edges (s, j) and (j, t) with true cost 2 each. If the true ownership information is known to the auctioneer, the most natural VCG mechanism would reduce to a second price auction: it will choose path (s, i), (i, t) as the winning path and pay agent a an amount equal to 4. However, if agent a hides his ownership information, the mechanism will treat edges (s, i) and (i, t) as owned by different agents. When the agents bid their true costs, the winning path stays the same, but the payment to agent a would be 2 × 3 = 6. Moreover, when ownership information is not available to the auctioneer, agent a can increase his utility by bidding lower than his true cost. For example, he can bid 0.5 for both edges (s, i) and (i, t). This does not change the winning path, but the payment to agent a would increase to 2 × 3.5 = 7. Hence, the straightforward VCG mechanism, which assumes that each edge is owned by a distinct agent, is not strategyproof in this extended model.
In this paper, we model situations in which each agent can own multiple edges at the same time, but ownership information is private. Thus the traditional path auction model is a special case of our extended model. The possibility of one agent having multiple identities is inherent in online communities. In an online auction system, each seller/buyer may have multiple accounts in the system. Now, if a buyer wants some combination of goods that can be expressed in path auction form, it will be hard for him to find the true identity of each seller account, and so he will be faced with the unknown-ownership scenario.
Related work and our results
Path auction games have been extensively studied in recent years. Nisan and Ronen introduced the shortest-path game in their paper on algorithmic mechanism design [3] , and showed that the VCG mechanism for this problem is computationally tractable. However, several authors have noted that the VCG mechanism may pay much more than the true cost of the winning path. This has led to the study of the frugality [5] of the VCG mechanism. Archer and Tardos [5] , and Elkind et al. [8] studied frugality in path auctions, and showed that payments can be arbitrarily high. Karlin et al. [9] extended the path model to a more general set system model and introduced a new frugality ratio definition; they designed a mechanism that performs better than the VCG in path auctions. The problem of an agent owning multiple edges was mentioned as future work in [9] . Immorlica et al. [6] studied first-price path auctions in the traditional single-ownership setting. They showed the existence of a strong -Nash equilibrium in bids, and bounded the payments in equilibrium. J. Schummer [17] studied the bribe-proof auction, in which no agent can pay another one to lie so that both of them are better off. Schummer showed that if the domain is rich, the only bribeproof mechanism is a constant function. However, path auction games do not satisfy the monotonically closed condition ("richness" condition) in [17] . Yokoo et al. [10] introduced the concept of false-name proof mechanisms, in which the (weakly) dominant strategy for each agent is to report his true values as well as true identities, and showed that in combinatorial auctions, there is no false-name proof mechanism that satisfies Pareto efficiency. The problem of unknown ownership [11] has also been studied in the context of job scheduling by Moulin.
The results we report here were presented in preliminary form at the NetEcon06 Workshop [16] . Following our work, Iwasaki et al. [18] recently designed two mechanisms MP and AP for path auction games. The MP mechanism is false-name-proof (can't self-split) when each agent owns only one edge. Moreover, a nice property of the MP mechanism is that its frugality ratio nearly matches a lower bound of any false-nameproof mechanism. The AP mechanism is false-name-proof when an agent can own multiple edges. However, one drawback of the AP mechanism is that it does not always purchase a feasible solution.
In this paper, we show that if the agents only submit bid prices in the auction for each edge (implicitly the auctioneer treats each edge as owned by a different agent), there is no strategyproof mechanism that satisfies individually rationality under assumption that the losing agent always has 0 utility. Our result does not need the assumption about the "richness" of domain as required in [17] . Moreover, we consider mechanisms in which agents are invited to reveal all their private information: the identities of edges as well as the costs. We show that previous results on false-name proof mechanisms [10] imply that there is no Pareto-efficient false-name proof mechanism in the extended path auction model. We next turn to a firstprice auction bidding game, and study -Nash equilibria of this game. For the class of parallel-path graphs, we constructively prove that at least one Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium exists. However, we find a non-parallel-path graph that does not have a Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium.
Definitions and Problem Statement
We now introduce formal definitions of the path auction game based on set systems defined in [9] . We begin by defining simple path auctions, in which ownership of each edge is known to be distinct. We then define an extended path auction model that incorporates multiple edge ownership.
Simple path auctions:
Given a graph G = (V, E), let each edge e ∈ E be owned by a distinct agent and have a cost c e , the true cost incurred on the owner if the edge is selected. This value is private, i.e. known only to agent that owns e. We define the feasible set F = {P | P is a path from the source s to the destination t}. Note that a path is represented by the set of its edges. The task of the auctioneer is to buy a path from s to t by auction. It consists of the following two steps:
(i) Each agent submits a sealed bid b e to the auctioneer. The bidding vector b is (b e1 , b e2 , ..., b em ), where b ei is the bidding price for the edge e i ∈ E. Moreover, let B denote the bidding space, which is the set of all possible bidding vectors. (ii) Given the bidding vector b, the auctioneer selects a path P from the feasible set F as the winning path, and computes a payment p e for each edge e ∈ P . An agent wins if he owns an edge e on the winning path P j ; otherwise he loses. In order to implement the auction, we need to design a mechanism (f, p 1 , p 2 , ..., p m ), where f : B → F selects one element in the feasible set as the winning path and p i : B → R computes the payment to agent i. Moreover, we assume that:
(i) (G, F ) is common knowledge to the auctioneer and all the agents.
(ii) The game is monopoly free, which means no edge is in all the feasible sets, i.e. P j ∈F P j = ∅. (iii) The agents are rational and have quasilinear utilities. The utility is defined to be the payment minus the incurred true cost, i.e., u e = p e − c e if e is on the winning path; or else u e = p e . The agents want to maximize their utilities.
Extended path auctions
We extend the simple path auctions model to allow for the possibility that each agent owns multiple edges. The edge set E can be partitioned as E = i E i , where E i is the set of edges owned by agent i. We also assume that an agent i that owns k i edges, i.e.
to use in an auction, one for each edge. We assume that E i and ID i are private information, which is only known to agent i. Moreover, for two different agents i and j, ID i ID j = ∅, i.e., an agent cannot claim an identity that belongs to another agent for one of his own edges. In the extended model, a game is monopoly free if, for any agent i, there is at least one path between s and t in graph (V, E \ E i ). Furthermore, given the winning path P , the utility for agent i is
According to different formats of bidding languages, we can define two formats of extended path auctions.
-Format I: in this type of auction, each agent is only asked to submit the bidding price for each edge he owns while keeping the identity information private. -Format II: in this type of auction, the agent is asked to submit identity information (possibly false) about the set of edges he owns as well as the bidding price for each edge he claims to own. We next will introduce some basic game theory definitions in the extended path auction model. Since an agent can own multiple edges in the extended model, the agent needs to submit a bidding price for each edge that belongs to him. Thus, let b i be the bidding vector of agent i while c i be the true cost vector of agent i. 
Definition 2 A bidding strategy b i of agent i is a dominant strategy, if for any bidding vector b −i of other agents and any bidding vector
In auctions of format I, we introduce the concept of strategyproofness.
Definition 3 A format I auction mechanism is strategyproof if it is a dominant strategy for each agent i to bid his true value
The VCG mechanism is strategyproof in the simple path auction, i.e. the dominant strategy of each agent is to bid his true cost in VCG mechanism. Besides strategyproofness, individual rationality, which requires that no agent should be paid less than the cost he incurs, is another important concept studied in mechanism design.
Definition 4 A mechanism is individually rational iff for any agent i, when he bids truthfully, the payment to agent i is at least the true cost he incurs in the solution chosen by the mechanism, i.e. every agent should have nonnegative utility in the mechanism if he bids truthfully.
In auctions of format II, we introduce the solution concept of false-name-proofness.
Definition 5 A format II auction mechanism is false-name-proof if for any agent, it is a dominant strategy to report the true identity information of each edge as well as the true cost of each edge he owns.
In both formats of extended path auctions, a mechanism will choose a winning path from feasible paths and make payments to the agents. The definition of Pareto efficiency is: Definition 6 A winning path selection rule is Pareto efficient if the mechanism chooses P i as the winning path such that ∀k,
In the economic literature, Pareto efficiency is defined to be an allocation such that there is no agent can be better off without making another agent worse off. The definition of Pareto efficiency in this paper follows from the definition in [10] , which is different from the standard definition in general. However, in the quasilinear utility setting we assume, those two definitions are equivalent.
The Nonexistence of Individually Rational Strategyproof Mechanisms
In the extended path auction model, one natural question is whether it is possible to design an auction mechanism that asks agents to report only edge costs (format I), such that it is in every agent's best interest to bid the true cost for each edge he owns. In this section, we show that no reasonable mechanism can meet this requirement. Note that the strategyproofness condition defined in this paper is essentially equivalent to the bribe-proof condition in [17] . However, since path auction games do not satisfy the monotonically closed condition, the results in [17] cannot be applied here.
We begin with a characterization of strategyproof auction mechanisms that is well known from the literature on auctions. We state the theorem in the following, as we will rely on it in our proofs. Theorem 1 [9, 14, 15] Actually, we can construct a trivial strategyproof mechanism, which always selects a fixed path as the winning path and pays a fixed amount of money to the edges on the path. We call such a mechanism the dictator mechanism. It is not hard to verify that the dictator mechanism is strategyproof. However, it does not satisfy individual rationality.
Our impossibility proof builds on the characterization of strategyproof mechanisms. We begin with the following lemma, which shows that for any individually rational strategyproof mechanism, any bid vector can be perturbed slightly to ensure that all winners have strictly positive net utilities. 
Proof. Suppose that b
1 is a given cost vector, and that when the agents bid according to b 1 , the winning path is P 1 , i.e. f (b 1 ) = P 1 . By assumption, the edges not on the winning path have utility 0 since they are paid 0 and have 0 incurred cost. If every edge on the winning path is paid strictly more than his bid, we are done. Otherwise, some of the edges on the winning path have utility exactly 0; in this case, we will modify the cost (and bid) vector according to the following procedure.
In the first modification step, for an edge e 1 ∈ P 1 , we decrease the costs of e 1 from b and f (b k+1 ) = P k+1 . Let T = T {e k }. Similar to the argument above, the edge e k must be on the new winning path P k+1 , and its utility must have increased by 2 k−1 because the payment to it does not change. Moreover, we claim that any edge e j ∈ T is still on the new winning path P k+1 and its utility cannot decrease by more than
It can happen that both edges e j and e k are owned by the same agent i, and the true cost of the edge e k is b k e k − 2 k−1 . Thus, agent i can increase its utility by increasing the bidding price of the edge e k to b k e k . This contradicts strategyproofness. Furthermore, since the utility of the edge e j ∈ T cannot decrease by more than 2 k−1 at the kth step and 2 j−1 > N i=j+1 2 i−1 for any finite number N > j, the edge e j always has positive utility. Therefore, given the assumption that the edges not on the winning path are always paid 0, the edge e j is always on the new winning path P k for k ≥ j. Thus, all the edges in T are on the winning path and have positive utilities.
Since the number of edges is finite, the above procedure must stop. When the process is terminated, suppose the winning path P = T and the final cost vector is b . According to the argument above, every winning agent must have positive utility when the agents have true costs b and bid truthfully.
We now prove the main result. The intuition behind this result is that for strategyproofness to hold in the extended model, the payments made to the set of winning edges must increase if all costs increase; this, however, implies that agents can profit by inflating their bids.
Theorem 2 There is no individually rational strategyproof format I mechanism in which all the edges not on the winning path are always paid 0.
Proof. Suppose there is a strategyproof mechanism. By Lemma 1, consider a bidding vector b such that losing agents have utilities 0 while winning agents have positive utilities. For an edge e j that is not on the winning path P , increasing b ej to b ej cannot change the winning path. We prove this by contradiction.
Suppose the winning path changes from P to P , then there exists an edge e ∈ P but e / ∈ P . According to Theorem 1, e j cannot be on P . Thus its utility is still 0. Now, suppose an agent i owns both e j and e. If the true cost of e j is b ej , agent i can increase its utility by understating e j 's true cost as b ej , since e has positive utility when it is on winning path P . This contradicts strategyproofness. Moreover, increasing b ej does not change the payment to any edge. For any edge e / ∈ P , the payment to it is always 0. Suppose increasing b ej to b ej could increase the payment to the edge e ∈ P from p e to p e , i.e. p e < p e . It can happen that an agent i owns both e j and e, and the true cost of the edge e j is b ej . Thus, agent i can increase its utility by overstating e j 's cost as b ej . This contradicts strategyproofness too. Similarly, we can show that increasing b ej to b ej cannot decrease the payment to an edge e ∈ P . Therefore, for an edge e j that is not on the winning path, increasing its bid cannot change either the winning path or the payment to any agent.
Similarly, we can prove that for an edge e j that is on the winning path, decreasing b ej cannot change either the winning path or the payment to any edge. Now we can construct a suitable pair of bid vectors that result in the same path being selected. According to Lemma )). This contradicts the fact that for any edge e j on the winning path P ,
Therefore, given the condition that the edges not on the winning path always get 0 payment, there is no strategyproof mechanism that satisfies individual rationality.
Remark: In the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, the contradictions occur even if each agent owns only two edges. Therefore, in the extended path auction game, there is no individually rational strategyproof mechanism in which the edges not on the winning path are paid 0, even if each agent can only have two edges. We believe that if we remove the assumption that the edges not on the winning path always get 0 payment, Theorem 2 still holds. It would be interesting to find a simple proof for such an extension of Theorem 2.
Given Theorem 2, the next natural question to ask is: if the auctioneer asks the agents to submit ownership information as well as the bidding price information (format II), is it possible to get a false-name-proof [10] Proposition 1 is shown by constructing a generic combinatorial auction example, which does not have a false-name-proof auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency. That example has two items to sell and three bidders, where bidder 1 is interested in packages {1},{2} and the whole package {1,2}, bidder 2 is only interested in the whole package {1,2} while bidder 3 is only interested in {2}. In particular, bidder 1 has Fig. 2 . no false-name-proof mechanism that satisfies Pareto efficiency two identities to use. Furthermore, the bidders are given an option to quit this game by bidding 0.
We now observe that this counterexample can be viewed as an instance of a path auction (which is a special class of combinatorial auctions). Each single item in the combinatorial auction corresponds to an edge in the path auction while the whole package {1,2} corresponds to a path between s and t. The path auction game is shown in Figure 2 . The true identity of the agent that each edge belongs to is represented as an integer in the parentheses. Upon the transformation, the proof of Proposition 1 still works for the path auction setting. Thus, the following result is immediate.
Corollary 1 In the extended path auction model, there is no false-name proof mechanism that satisfies Pareto efficiency.
Proof. In order to prove this corollary, we first transform the generic combinatorial auction example of Yokoo et al. [10] to a path auction case as described above. Note that in the combinatorial auction example, the feasible set with the highest bidding price will be the winner. However, path auctions, as one type of procurement auctions, will choose the feasible set with the lowest bidding price as the winning path. To accommodate this difference, we change the directions of all the inequalities in the proof of Proposition 1 in [10] . Moreover, if a bidding price is perturbed by + in [10] , it is perturbed by − in the path auction case instead. Thus, the modified proof of Proposition 1 in [10] works exactly for the path auction case and the corollary is proved.
Existence of a Pareto Efficient Pure Strategy -Nash Equilibrium
Since strategyproofness is not feasible in the extended path auction model, we can consider weakening the solution concept. The concept of -Nash equilibrium, which has been applied to path auctions in [6] , is a natural candidate. In this section, we study the existence of -Nash equilibria in extended path auction model under the first-price auction mechanism [6] , which elicits the bids from the agents, chooses the cheapest path with respect to the bidding vector as the winning path and pays each winning agent exactly the bidding price. Immorlica et al. [6] showed that there is always an -Nash equilibrium in the simple path auction model. One drawback of the concept of Nash equilibria is that an arbitrary -Nash equilibrium may have low social walfare. Thus, we require that the Nash equilibria we will study below satisfies Pareto efficiency. Another drawback of the concept of -Nash equilibrium is that there exist equilibria in which losing agents bid below their true costs. To eliminate such unnatural equilibria, we assume that the bidding price of each edge is at least its true cost, i.e. ∀e, b e ≥ c e . With those natural constraints, we will show that, because of the multiple edge ownership, a Pareto efficient -Nash equilibrium only exists for a limited class of graphs in extended path auctions.
First, we show the existence of a Pareto efficient -Nash equilibrium in the parallel-path graph [13] , which can be defined as: Definition 7 A parallel-path graph is a graph that can be represented as k P k , where P k is the kth path from s to t and ∀i = j, P
c e denote the cost of path P k with respect to true cost vector c. Consider a sorted list of paths from low to high according to these true costs, i.e. the path with lower cost has smaller index. For any agent A i , let L(A i ) be the smallest path index such that path P L(Ai) does not have an edge owned by agent A i , but all paths with smaller path indices than L(A i ) have at least one edge owned by agent A i . We compute L(A i ) for each agent that has at least one edge on P 1 . Note that L(A i ) must exist, under the monopoly-free assumption on the set system. We constructively find a Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium for parallel paths graph in the following theorem. The proof is motivated by [6] . Theorem 3 If the underlying network is a parallel-path graph, the first-price path auction has a Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The -Nash equilibrium bidding vector is constructed as follows. Initially, suppose that each agent bid her true cost i.e. b = c. Let
b e denote the cost of path P k with respect to the bidding vector b. Pick an agent A k that has at least one edge on P 1 , and which has the highest value of L(A k ) of all agents that have edges on P 1 . In order to find an -Nash equilibrium bidding vector, we first pick one edge in E A k P 1 , and increase its bidding price by 
, where b is the new bidding vector. We call the final bidding vector b f . Note that the bidding price for each edge in b f , except those belong to agent A k , is exactly its true cost. Since the first price auction mechanism always selects the path with minimum cost, P 1 is the winning path under b f and A k has at least one edge on it. We claim that b f is an -Nash equilibrium bidding vector. This is proved by analyzing the strategies of all the agents in three cases:
Case I: If an agent A i is a losing agent, he will bid the true costs for all the edges in E Ai . Consider the following two subcases: (i) For any path j, if the sum of bidding prices for edges in E Ai P j increases, it cannot change the winning path, therefore the utility of agent A i cannot be improved; (ii) If the sum of bidding prices for edges in E Ai P j decreases such that P j becomes the winning path, the utility of A i would be negative. Thus, agent A i cannot improve his utility through a unilateral deviation.
Case 
) keeps unchanged. Thus, for any path P j , the sum of bidding prices for edges in E Ai P j cannot increase by more than ; otherwise, P r will be the winning path and agent A i has utility 0. Therefore, agent A i cannot increase his own utility by more than through a unilateral deviation.
Case III:
Similar to the analysis in case II, agent A k cannot improve his utility more than by increasing the bidding prices of edges he owns. Otherwise, P L(A k ) would be the winning path and the utility of agent A k would be 0. On the other hand, for any path P j with an index j < L(A k ), if the sum of bidding prices for edges in E A k P j decreases such that the path P j is the winning path, the utility of agent A k must be less than
. Thus, agent A k cannot improve his utility by more than through a unilateral deviation.
It is clear that b f is Pareto efficient, since the winning path P 1 has the minimum true cost. Therefore, any parallel-path graph can have a Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium when the agents bid according to b f .
Although there exists a Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium for path auctions with parallelpath graphs, we can find a non-parallel-path graph that does not have any Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium. We show this counter example in Figure 3 ; for each edge label, the integer in parentheses denotes the identity of the agent who owns that edge. Proposition 2 The graph shown in Figure 3 cannot have any Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium in the first-price path auction mechanism.
Proof. There are 5 agents in this game and 5 paths from s to t: Figure 3 , there is only one path that does not have edges owned by him. We can assume that the path P j does not have edges owned by agent i, but for 4 other paths, agent i owns edges on each of them. Note that agent i owns only one edge on the winning path P 1 . Thus, agent i can increase the bidding prices of his edges (but still keep P 1 as the winning path) such that his utility is increased by at least , which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, if b is a Pareto efficient -Nash equilibrium bidding vector, the cost of each path with respect to b can differ at most by . Let Moreover, according to our assumption that the bidding price of each edge is at least its true cost, i.e., ∀e, c e ≤ b e , the following inequality holds:
c p6,p7 + c p7,p8 ≤ When is small enough and the true cost of each edge is large enough, contradiction occurs. Therefore, there is no Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium for the graph in Figure 3 using the first-price path auction mechanism.
Remark : In the proof of Proposition 2, we implicitly assume that c p6,p7 = c p7,p6 as well as c p7,p8 = c p8,p7 , i.e., edges (p 6 , p 7 ) and (p 7 , p 8 ) are undirected. However, the proof still works for directed graphs. To see this, suppose (p 6 , p 7 , p 8 ) is a directed path from p 6 to p 8 while there is another directed path P from p 8 back to p 6 in Figure 3 . Moreover, assume that the edges on the path P are owned by agents 2 and 3. Then, we can get |b P + C − B| ≤ , where b P is the sum of bidding prices of all the edges on P , and |A + B − C| ≤ . Thus, the final inequality of the above proof is changed to c p6,p7 + c p7,p8 + c P ≤ 2 , where c P is the true cost of the new directed path from p 8 back to p 6 . Contradiction still occurs.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we studied path auction games in which an agent can own multiple edges, and ownership information is private. This is a natural model for many scenarios involving team formation and routing. However, our results show that strategyproofness is not feasible in this extended model. Moreover, path auctions in general graphs may not even have a Pareto efficient pure strategy -Nash equilibrium. These results suggest several directions for future research. The most important open problem is to design a reasonable mechanism that bounds the total payment of the auctioneer in settings such as this. While we prove that such a mechanism cannot be strategyproof, this goal might be achievable with a weaker solution concept.
